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From Chechnya to Israel: Social Movement Analyses of 
Opposition Groups 
by Anne Marie Baylouny  
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government.. 
Introduction  
This issue of Strategic Insights presents articles applying social movement theory to the analysis 
of opposition movements in the Muslim and Arab worlds. The articles show how social movement 
theory can aid in understanding the impetus and the dynamics of opposition groups. While many 
analyses focus on leaders of opposition and Islamist groups, these articles highlight the 
grassroots and membership of a social movement as a key factor in mobilization or failure to 
mobilize. 
The articles by Anderson, Fahoum, and Gust apply the concept of framing to understand the 
success and failure of mobilization. Frames used by a movement or group must resonate with the 
populace. Anderson explains the concept of framing, and argues that an understanding of 
framing can benefit the United States in Iraq. Fahoum analyzes the Chechen movement from a 
framing perspective, explaining why early frames resonated with the population, resulting in 
mobilization, while later, more religious frames failed to align with the populace's ideas and 
interests. Gust shows that framing is a central factor in the lack of mobilization of the Israeli Arabs 
up until the second intifada. It is not repression alone that mobilizes. For mobilization to occur, the 
conflict and cause of mobilizing must be framed in terms that resonate with the populace. Gust 
shows that at least until the second intifada, a frame joining the Israeli Arabs with their fellow 
Palestinians, most of who reside outside Israel, did not hold sufficient appeal to mobilize Israeli 
Arabs. 
The articles by Munson and Howk analyze the trajectory of opposition movements in Israel and 
Oman respectively using social movement theory. Munson disaggregates the Israeli settler 
movement, demonstrating the role of electoral politics in the movement's growth, the importance 
of a security frame to the popularity of the settlers' cause, and the role of violence and 
radicalization. Howk examines the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman, highlighting the role of international 
alliances in aiding mobilization and particular government actions in decreasing it. 
Finally, O'Connell tackles the theoretical nut of repression, analyzing when it results in 
mobilization and when it does not. He attempts to triangulate the different conclusions of research 
into repression and group mobilization. At some points, it appears that movements are stifled by 
repression, only to reappear later stronger and more violent. O'Connell concludes that the 
insights of nuanced theories disaggregating repression by timing and type are those which travel 
best and hold across new cases. Indeed, the effects of repression can only be delineated in 
conjunction with the political, framing, and resource dynamics of social movement theory. 
Islamism and Social Movement Theory 
As the hot intellectual topic of the day, Islamism is attracting numerous new researchers. The 
result has been a plethora of studies, some of which have reinvented the wheel, spending time to 
prove what others have already done, or superficial analyses attractive for publication but 
contributing little to our knowledge base. As scholars we are not talking to each other, not building 
our theory or store of insights. Data is accumulated in pieces, unconnected to larger questions or 
an interpretive framework. This can be remedied, I suggest, through adoption of a unified 
approach or research program anchored in a political framework.[1] Through this framework, 
scholars of Islamism and opposition movements in general can comparatively expand the 
universe of cases to discover what, if anything, is indeed unique about Islamism, and yield solid 
and effective policy conclusions. 
Contentious mobilization, often called by the more user-friendly social movement theory, can 
provide such an approach.[2] Beginning as the study of social movements, the field includes non-
movement forms of collective mobilization in order to make demands. The literature on 
contentious mobilization is more precisely described not as a theory, but a perspective for 
analyzing mechanisms of authority-opposition interaction and determining the requirements and 
dynamics of mobilization. This framework tells us what factors we need to know about groups, 
and provides a general ordering of the importance of differing variables and processes to the 
whole. 
Simply, contentious mobilization and social movement theories are superior to other approaches 
because they explain more. Non-relational and non-comparative theories have been pushed out 
of the analysis of contentious actions in the rest of the world for this reason. Aspects of analysis 
that have withstood empirical research[3] have been retained within a unified perspective that 
focuses on political context, forms of mobilization, and frames or ideologies—how the group or 
movement sells itself to would-be members. Collective mobilization to make demands occurs on 
a continuum of how sustained the mobilization. A non-recurring event is at one end, with the 
continuously sustained mobilization of rebellion or revolution (the success of mobilization does 
not alter its internal characteristics) at the other end. Social movements fall in between. Groups 
that draw from the strength of the social movement, but are no longer connected to it, can be 
analyzed in this approach. 
The mobilization framework avoids the pitfalls of viewing groups ahistorically, out of the context of 
their relation to authorities, ideologically unique, or reducing groups to economic or class 
characteristics. Further, this perspective guards against over-ideologizing Islamist movements, i.e. 
viewing the tactics of movements as directly stemming from their ideology and ignoring the 
context.[4] It does this not by ignoring ideology, but instead viewing it contextually as one 
indicator among many. We have learned that protests, demonstrations, and opposition mobilizing 
are political acts with political goals. While analysts often feel drawn to describe them as 
emotional, economic or desperate, doing so avoids the political questions such actions raise and 
still provides no answers. 
Alternative approaches have numerous problems. Many suffer from the unknowing incorporation 
of assumptions regarding causality that have been questioned or disproved. Mobilization theory’s 
relatively long comparative research background has brought these problems to light, yielding a 
more complicated and disaggregated view of reality. Alternative approaches are most obviously 
lacking when we cannot even pose relevant questions through these perspectives. How can 
ideological study of a group tell us when the movement alters that ideology and why? Left 
unaddressed are such topics as Islamic feminism, the role of social services and charity in 
generating support for movements, and when local movements ally with transnational ones, 
effectively altering their own goals in the process. 
Despite a growing mass of profiles demonstrating Islamists as non-traditional, involved in the 
most modern sectors, upwardly mobile, and actively re-interpreting Islamic doctrine, the dominant 
approaches remain focused on economic deprivation and interpretation of religious texts. Ever 
increasing data is confirming that while economics may enter into movement calculations, basing 
our interpretation of groups, members, and the trajectory of Islamism as a whole on an economic 
interpretation is limiting and misleading.[5] Economic factors alone cannot explain why groups 
arise or why they turn violent. Nor can they explain membership (except when soldiers or 
members are regularly paid). As White demonstrates for the IRA, such a perspective cannot 
address participation by those without direct grievances.[6] 
Fortunately, egregious mass theories of old have been buried under a mass of empirical data 
contradicting their assumptions. Group members are not marginal, deviant, poor, or characterized 
by a particular unique personality, culturally or religiously determined. In this older analysis, 
organizing was viewed as irrational, a pathology. This view was influenced by an elitism that 
feared the masses, ignoring the pivotal role of mobilizing in creating western democracies. Such 
biases and assumptions regarding mobilizing are still reflected in the knee-jerk explanations 
utilized often in journalism. The economic perspective also suffers from a functionalist view of 
causality, positing a direct linear correlation between economic conditions and mobilization or 
violence. This contradicts what we have learned about the course of mobilization: if grievances 
were immediately and accurately reflected in the creation of movements and trends, reality would 
be quite different. Movement research has demonstrated the difficulty of sustaining mobilization, 
and the many ways its path can be side-tracked away from connections to its population. While in 
democratic societies movements are more directly representative, in authoritarian societies group 
outcomes are highly distorted from grievances. The requirements of mobilization force 
movements to organize underground, give power to ideologies able to withstand such 
circumstances, and shift membership toward die-hards willing and able to continue in these 
conditions. The relationship between societal demands and the resulting movement must be 
discovered empirically, not assumed. The group’s stated goals may differ dramatically from the 
local concerns that fuel the organization and feed membership. 
Many analysts linger in Quranic exegesis, examining how the Quran made Islamists radical. 
However, textual religious approaches are problematic. Religion is fundamentally interpretable 
and changing. Perspectives on “correct” interpretation do not remain unaltered through time, and 
any analysis must answer the question of “why now.” If the Quran, written long ago, is at fault, 
why only now has the problem arisen? Further, why are secular ideologies equally, if not more, 
implicated in terrorist acts? Interpretation is contextual. Local institutional, historical, and political 
backgrounds are key. Ideological statements often side-track the researcher. Alongside radical 
statements, the actions of some groups demonstrate moderation and doctrinal flexibility. The 
reverse could also be the case, as groups stating moderate ideologies engage in violent actions. 
Further, the authoritative basis of the Quran is not one-sided. Women have used particular 
readings of the holy book to marginalize male views in Islamic feminism or the gender jihad.[7] 
The outcomes are remarkably similar to the justifications and new interpretations of women’s 
roles used in earlier eras in the west, when public service and home were combined as the latter 
served as justification for the former. In some areas Islamist women have gone farther than the 
previous western era. The idea of public service as a duty has been extended to include jobs as 
engineers, doctors, and lawyers, not just extensions of family life such as social service and 
charity work. 
Tactics and ideology, means and end-goals, are not always correlated. Democratic movements 
use violence, and anti-democratic ones have been non-violent.[8] Tactics are strategies that alter, 
not essential movement characteristics.[9] Increasing complexity too, made possible through 
information and technological advances, does not necessarily alter the nature of the action. 
Movement choices are relational: they develop in intimate interaction with their external 
environment. Thus any analysis omitting the political playing field and organizational potential of 
Islamist and alternative groups misses some of the driving forces for the structure and tactics of 
the organization. 
Movements are political, and as such, we need to recognize the danger of leaving politics to 
dissidents: it polarizes and radicalizes. Ultimately, we should encourage the legalization of 
political participation of Islamists in the middle sphere of the local. As Goodwin aptly 
demonstrates, politically exclusive regimes are vulnerable to broad oppositional social 
movements.[10] Political inclusion provides social groups an interest in the regime, which is 
realistically viewed as a safer bet than revolutionary activism. Outlawing all forms of protest 
merely channels it into violent avenues, while legalizing it within bounds encourages non-violent 
protest and marginalizes violence. Instead of policies to eliminate Islamist groups, our goal should 
be to encourage their activism in the middle sphere of the local, connected to the community. It is 
this form that is most moderating and accommodating. In this sphere we can channel the practice 
of protest into non-violent formats.  
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